Judicial Decision and Rethinking the Constitutional Principles Concerning Treaty Making Power and Process of Thailand by Umpai, K. (Kiarttiphorn)
Brawijaya Law Journal Vol.4 No.1 2017 Constitutional Issues and Indigenous Rights
DOI: http://dx.doi.org/10.21776/ub.blj.2017.004.01.01 1
JUDICIAL DECISION AND RETHINKING THE CONSTITUTIONAL
PRINCIPLES CONCERNING TREATY MAKING POWER AND
PROCESS OF THAILAND
Kiarttiphorn Umpai1
1 School of Law, National Institute of Development Administration (NIDA)
E-mail: popylaw@hotmail.com
Submitted : 27-09-2016 | Accepted: 24-02-2017
ABSTRACT
This paper aims to examine the treaty making power and process in recent constitutional
provisions reforms in Thailand. It aims to analyze whether the constitutional provision has
affected the treaty-making crisis. This study relied on the theory of the sovereignty of state
exercised by the executive branch in compliance with the treaty making power concept, the
separation of powers, and the checks and balances doctrine. The findings revealed that
Thailand’s constitutional amendment related to treaty making processes, proposing a
negotiation framework approved by the legislative branch or public participation during a prior
negotiation period, is not in compliance with the treaty making concept and state practices of
foreign countries. However, Thailand has already reformed the constitutional provision. The
implications are that there must be an amendment to the Constitution defining the processes
and characteristics of treaties that shall be approved by the legislative branch.
Keywords: Treaty making power, law of treaty, negotiation framework, public participation
I. INTRODUCTION
Treaty making power principles
emerged in the year 1932 with the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand
B.E. 2475 (1932), now the Constitution of
the Kingdom of Thailand (Temporary) B.E.
2557 (2014). Principally, the King reserves
the prerogative to conclude treaty and
international agreements, such as peace
treaties, armistice treaties, and treaties with
foreign countries and international
organizations. This power gives the state
sovereignty concerning international affairs
and relations.
However, Constitutional power to
exercise sovereignty related to treaty making
rests not only in the executive branch of
government but also rests in the legislative
branch, to which the constitution gives
sovereignty in terms of check and balances
over the treaty making power. Moreover, the
constitution provides the constitutional court
power concerning the adjudication of
conflicts between the executive and
legislative branches over treaty making
power and processes.
It is apparent that the exercise of treaty
making sovereignty under the checks and
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balances doctrine 1 results in hindering
international relations and treaty making in
Thailand in unprecedented ways. Thailand’s
treaty making problems have resulted from a
non-clarified constitutional provision with
respect to the question of who is privileged
with the treaty making power. At same time,
the legislative branch now only preserves
“parliamentary participation” 2 in terms of
checks and balances and is no longer meant
to conclude treaty making alongside the
executive branch. In particular, the
legislative branch only preserves power
related to essential treaties that impact the
national interest.
Before the conclusion of a treaty
period, the executive branch has a "duty" to
propose a negotiation framework for
approval by the legislative branch and it also
has a duty to provide information to the
public and a public hearing, in compliance
with “public participation” rules. In other
words, the new principles in the Constitution
seem designed to give something like
"control and monitoring" authority to the
legislative branch. The use of such power by
the legislative branch, however, is not in
accordance with the principles and doctrines
of "the separation of powers," "checks and
1M J C Vile's, Constitutionalism and the Separation of
Powers: Montesquieu (Liberty Fund, 2nd ed, 1998) [11]
<http://oll.libertyfund.org/pages/montesquieu-and-
the-separation-of-powers>.
2Luzius Wildhaber, ‘Parliamentary Participation in
Treaty-Making, Report on Swiss Law-Europe’
(1991) 67 Chicago-Kent Law Review 437, 439.
balances," and "parliamentary
participation." Thus, it can be said that this
exercise of power by the legislative branch
in the new principles of Thailand’s
constitution is contrary to the principles of
the law.
Any failure to conclude treaties is
caused, therefore, by essential
"misunderstandings in principle" related to
both the organization and the exercise of
each organ of power involved in the process
of treaty making, especially the power of the
"Administrative Court’s" jurisdiction to
monitor the exercise of executive power in
"international agreements." Under
"constitutional authority," treaties are called
an “act of the government" and treaty
making power is not, therefore, viewed as a
“legal authority” but is instead called an
"administrative act” and is under the
jurisdiction of law enforcement or other laws
and regulations. This, oversight of this
power is under the jurisdiction of the
Administrative Court.
In the Joint Communiqué on Preah
Vihear case3, the constitutional court widely
interpreted this power by adding the word
“may” related to treaties that change the
territory of the Kingdom of Thailand, but the
3Joint Communiqué on Preah Vihear Case [The
Constitutional Court of Thailand] No. 6-7/2551, 8
July 2008 reported in [2008] 125 (108A) The Royal
Gazette of Thailand 21-22.
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constitutional provision no longer specifies
this word. The decision of the Constitutional
Court can impact treaty making by the
executive branch. Thus, it is not clear what
kind of treaties or international agreements
need to be approved by the legislature.
Therefore, the executive branch always
submits treaties and international
agreements to Parliament for approval
before concluding them in order to disperse
the political responsibility of the executive
branch.
As noted above, the research question
for this paper raised the two following
issues. First, what factors in Thailand’s
constitution related to treaty making powers
and processes impact the international
relations process? Second, how should
Thailand’s constitution be reformed in
compliance the doctrines of the separation of
powers and checks and balances as well as
the Vienna convention?
Therefore, this paper will examine the
treaty making power and process conflict
between the Executive and Legislature and
analyze the extent to which the rules and the
judicial decisions have impacted, or may
impact, the separation of powers and checks
and balances doctrines. Part I will provide
overviews of the treaty making power
concept and theory, the functions of the
constitutional organ, and the separation of
powers. Part II will examine the existing
principles of treaty making process for states
which are in compliance with the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties. Part III
will study the state practices of the USA and
France in relation to treaty making power
and processes and provide a comparison of
such features on their legal and practical
grounds. Part IV will discuss the treaty
making power problem and crisis of
Thailand. Finally, Part IV will rethink and
re-envision Thailand’s treaty making power
and process.
II. LEGAL MATERIALS AND
METHODS
This paper lies on several relevant
international conventions and relevant
domestic laws concerning treaty making
power. It uses Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties 1969 and relevant
customary international law relating to the
making of international treaties. It further
analyses Thailand’s Constitution as well as
other relevant domestic laws.
This paper uses a normative juridical
method, including reviewing and analyzing
the treaty making power and process of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
and the constitutional provisions of
Thailand. The relevant treaty making power
concepts, separation of powers, and check
and balances doctrines are analyzed. The
approach in this paper is statute-based and
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comparative. It also tries to discover whether
there is a conflict of power between the
judicial branch, the constitutional and
administrative courts, and the executive and
legislative branches regarding treaty
processes.
III. RESULT AND DISCUSSION
Judicial Review And Treaty Making
Crisis: Organ, Power And Process
Since the topic examined here
concerns the treaty making crisis of
Thailand, it is necessary to rethink and re-
envision the constitutional principles related
to, firstly, treaty making power theory;
secondly, international law and treaty
making power; thirdly, treaty making power
and processes among the USA, France and
Thailand; fourthly, the adjudicated problem
of exercising treaty-making power in
Thailand; and, lastly, remaining problems to
the reform of the treaty-making process and
power principles in Thailand.
Treaty Making Power
It is appropriate to begin with an
examination of the nature of the treaty
making power concept and theory. This
4Charles S Clancy, ‘An Organic Conception of the
Treaty-Making Power vs. State Rights as Applicable
to the United States’ (1908) 7 (1) Michigan Law
Review 19, 34
<http://www.jstor.org/stable/1274085>; Arun
Panuphong, Diplomacy and International Affairs
concept is also described as the mechanism
of exercise of sovereignty in terms of
cooperation among state parties through
international relationships and agreements.
An evident instrument for this aim, the
purpose of a treaty is to express clearly the
legally binding agreements that emerge from
concluding an international agreement. At
the same time, the treaty making power
concept generally involves the exercise of
the authority of executive branches in
international relations. This concept
emerged from analyzing the function of the
constitutional organ in compliance with
domestic and international law. Principally,
the exercise of this power, including
restricted power, must be performed in
compliance with the Constitution of each
state.4
There is no doubt of the international
role in the conduct of the international
relations of the government on behalf of the
state5 through a state representative. It can
be said that this is the exercise the state
jurisdiction under the “Principle-Agent
(Faculty of Political Sciences, Thammasart
University Press, 1986) 4.
5United Nations, Treaty Handbook (United Nations
Publication, 2012) 3.
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Theory” 6 or “Mandate Theory”,7 which is
related to administrative power held by the
executive branch in international relations.
Moreover, historical data have supported the
concept that state practice in international
relations are constituted by an envoy on
behalf of the monarchy serving as a sign that
shows the relationship between the
countries. In the treaty making power
concept under international law, however,
this power is no longer run by the state, 8
since each state has given consent to be
bound by international agreements.
This study also found that the
substantive features 9 of the separation of
powers are explained best as a function of
the constitutional organ,10 which defines the
role and authority of the organ overseeing
treaty making power rather than the formal
separation of powers. Therefore, the
allocation of such power must consider the
extent to which such powers are
characteristic of "political power" or "legal
6Laurence R Helfer and Timothy Meyer, The
Evolution of Codification: A Principal-Agent
Theory of the International Law Commission’s
Influence (5 May 2015) Duke University, School of
Law 1, 4-5 <http://
scholarship.law.duke.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=6134&context=faculty_scholarship>.
7Prasit Eakkabutra, International Law Volume I:
Treaty (Winyuchon, 4th ed, 2008) 101.
8The Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties,
opened for signature 23 May 1969, 1155 UNTS 331
(entered into force on 27 January 1980) preamble,
art 6 and art 7. (‘Law of Treaties Convention’)
9Pornson Leangboonlertchai, Rule of Law
Development: German and France (19 March 2014)
power”. 11 This is important, in part, because
the power that is exercised by a political or a
legal authority can affect consideration of
the “liability of the state", especially of
whether that power involves a "political
responsibility" or a "constitutional
responsibility", 12 as in the case of an
impeachment. However, treaties are not a
legal responsibility with supreme authority
held by the Judicial Branch or the Supreme,
Administrative or Constitutional Courts.
Vienna Convention On The Law Of
Treaty
The principles of the Vienna
Convention of 1969 affirm that the
Executive shall have the power and duties to
exercise sovereignty in relation to making
treaties. The International Commission of
the United Nations has established a concept
for drafting conventions that aim to conclude
in mutual agreement between parties. 13
Public Law Net 1 <http://www.pub-
law.net/publaw/view.aspx?id=1639>.
10Theodore Georgopoulos, The Checks and Balances
Doctrine in Member States as A Rule of EC Law: The
Cases of France and Germany in EUSA 8th
International Conference, 27-29 March 2003,
Nashville Tennessee 3
<http://aei.pitt.edu/6493/1/001523_1.PDF>.
11W J Stankiewicz, Aspects of Political Theory:
Classical Concepts in an Age of Relativism (Cassell
and Collier Macmillan, 1976) 69-70.
12Pornson Leangboonlertchai, Problems on Politician
Impeachment (19 March 2014) Public Law Net 1-2
<http://www.pub-
law.net/publaw/view.aspx?id=1438>.
13Helfer and Meyer, above n 8, 1.
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Hence, the regime of international law was
set up specifically for the purpose of
outlining treaty making procedures,
including how to conclude treaties, the
completeness and the incompleteness of
treaty making, and exclusive rights for
establishing and annulling treaties. Most
importantly, International law shall not
intervene in matters defined under the
domestic law, such as which organs under
the Constitution have the power to make
treaties.
This research yielded two conclusions:
1) international law affirms that the
Executive shall have the authorities and
duties to exercise the power of sovereignty
in relation to making treaties because it
affirms that the states have the power to
make treaties because it determines only the
procedures but does not indicate which
organ under the Constitution shall have such
power; and 2) the representative of the State
must hold the title of Executive or be elected
based on the exercise of the Executive’s
power.
Further, international law affirms that
the State has the power to make treaties,14
but it does not affirm that the government,
on behalf the Executive, shall have the
sovereign power to conclude a treaty. The
14Law of Treaties Convention art 6; Alina
Kaczorowska, Public International Law (Routledge,
4th ed, 2010) 176.
15Pasit Eakkaburtra, International Law Volume II:
State (Winyuchon, 2nd ed, 2011) 13-14.
State itself, under international law, is
entitled to be considered abstract and non-
physical juristic person. 15 Moreover, any
action of the State shall be accomplished
concretely and legitimately by a variety of
state authorities or representatives as
provided by law. As a result, exercising the
State’s sovereign power in relation to treaty
king shall not be accomplished unless the
government action is done because, in the
context of the international law, the
government shall have the right to conclude
treaties on behalf the State.16
However, the 1969 Vienna Convention
does not stipulate specifically that the
government’s so-called Executive Branch is
the key organ having treaty-making power.
The study found that when the issue was
raised during the discussion agenda on
drafting the Convention of Vienna in 1968,
most argued that the government’s power
may be expressed in mixed States, including
Union, Federal State and Political Sub-
Divisions. Last but not least, the Assembly
accepted that any independent state that
adopted the Convention shall have power to
make treaties, which is not a power
exclusively provided by the Constitution or
domestic law. Some States may restrict
treaty-making powers 17 to the central
16Jaturon Tirawat, International Law (Winyuchon, 3rd
ed, 2012) 212.
17Helmut Steinberger, Constitutional Subdivisions of
States or Unions and their Capacity to Conclude
Treaties Comments on Art. 5 Para. 2 of the ILC’s
1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties (Max-
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government of a Federation,18 for example,
while others may provide that each State or
administration shall have the power to make
treaties on only some matters.19
Finally, the Assembly voted to remove
the capability of each State to conclude
international agreements when each State
could not specify clearly using a few words
its treaty making powers and practices,
meaning that “the government” and not “the
state” shall have the power to make treaties.
For multi-state nations, this provokes
ambiguity over whether the power of making
international agreements shall belong to the
central government or to each state’s
government, which is another reason it is
stipulated that only the State, conceived as
“the government”, shall have the power to
conclude treaties, not another organ under
domestic law. 20
Notwithstanding, subject to the
provisions of the Vienna Convention, in
terms of Full Power, the Convention
designates a person or persons as state
representative to conclude treaties. People
with Full Power 21 and people making
treaties ex-officio include President of the
State, the Head of the government, or even
Planck-Institut für ausländisches öffentliches Recht
und Völkerrecht, 1967) 411, 418
<http://www.zaoerv.de/27_1967/27_1967_3_c_41
1_428.pdf>.
18United Nations, United Nations Conference on the
Law of Treaties, First session Vienna, 26 March –
24 May 1968, Official Records, Summary Records
the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Not only
may the legal status of a person with either
ex-officio or full powers have been
bestowed without power of attorney, but
these persons also, in accordance with their
domestic laws, take on the role, power, and
duties of the Executive. These persons are
not given the power to make laws or to
decide on legal problems.
This study has shown that although
international law does not stipulate that the
Executive shall have the power to conclude
treaties, under the principles of international
law, only the Executive has the power to
conclude international treaties and
agreements.
A Comparative Study On Treaty Making
The central issue of this study is that
the Executive is the key organ that exercises
the sovereignty to make international treaties
whereas the Legislative is a secondary organ
that exercises power to participate at some
stages in the treaty-making process.
of the Plenary Meetings and of the Meetings of the
Committee of the Whole (United Nations, 1969) 60
<http://legal.un.org/diplomaticconferences/lawoftr
eaties-1969/vol/english/1st_sess.pdf>.
19Ibid 64; Steinberger, above n 19, 420.
20United Nations, above n 20, 68-69.
21Law of Treaties Convention art 7.
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A. Key Organ Exercising Treaty-
Making Power
The reason why the author of this
study would like to draw attention to a
comparative study between the USA and
France is that the provisions of Thailand’s
Constitution in the context of treaty making
were drafted, initially, to be similar to those
of France. Further, Thailand has maintained
a dual-court system comprising the Court of
Justice and the Administrative Court. In
addition, there are similarities between
Thailand and the USA with respect to
Legislature’s participation in proposing a
treaty negotiation framework for prior
approval by the Legislature itself.
In the context of this study, it could be
said that the treaty-making practices of the
USA, 22 the Republic of France 23 and
Thailand tend in the same direction: these
are in the hands of the Executive (called the
president, or the government), which is
considered the key organ exercising
sovereignty to make treaties with other
States or international organizations. 24
22 International Legal Research Tutorial, U.S. Treaties
and Agreements-The Process, (28 August 2014)
Duke Law [2]
<https://law.duke.edu/ilrt/treaties_3.htm>; Amos S
Hershey, ‘Treaty-Making Power with Special
Reference to the United States’ (1926) 1 (5) Indiana
Law Journal 261, 262
<http://www.repository.law.indiana.edu/ilj/vol1/iss
5/2>.
23Amos S Hershey, ‘Treaty-Making Power with Special
Reference to the United States’ (1926) 1 Indiana Law
Journal 261, 262.
Similarly, these three countries all
have the power to conclude treaties of
different forms in accordance with their
constitutional provisions, but these
provisions vary in procedures and processes.
For example, in the United States, as a result
of political evolution and necessity, 25 the
president is responsible for formally
concluding two forms of international
agreements: treaties and executive
agreements. 26 It is presumed that the
conclusion of formal treaties shall be
accomplished upon at least a two-thirds vote
of the Senate. For this reason, the executive
in the United States has developed alternate
forms of international agreement that do not
have to meet this requirement. Unlike in
Thailand or France, an “executive
agreement” can be carried out regardless of
prior approval of the Senate.
Notwithstanding, with consideration
to the “forms” of general treaty-making
powers, there are not differences, as each
country’s laws conform to the general
principle providing that the “treaty-making
power is in the hands of the Executive”. In
24Jantajira Aimayura, et al, Check and Balance
Mechanism to Executive Branch Power on Free
Trade Negotiation (Thailand Research Fund, 2006)
12-13.
25United States Senate, ‘Executive Agreement’
Treaties (20 August 2013) [1]
<http://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/com
mon/briefing/Treaties.htm>.
26Manit Jumpa and Pornson Leangboonlertchai,
United States Constitution: The Explanations on
the Principles and Case Law (Winyuchon, 2009)
98.
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other words, the Executive has the final
power of making treaties regardless of the
Legislature’s participation in the initial
process.
B. Secondary Organ Exercising Specific
Power of Approval
It is generally recognized that the
power of the US Senate, the French General
Assembly, or even the Parliament of
Thailand are not different in principle. The
Legislature of these three countries has only
the power and duties to give approval before
expressing consent to be bound by the
executive and to ratify their accession,
approval or acceptance. The US Senate gives
approval for making all types of treaties
whereas Thailand and the Republic of
France’s Legislature are each responsible for
approval of some forms of treaty, especially
treaties of importance that may affect
national security and interests. These
treaties, for example, relate to the nation’s
territory, trade, finances, or agreements
modifying provisions that have the status of
statutory law,27 for example. Different forms
of treaty have arisen from the fact that
Thailand and the French Republic are not
27Gerald L Neuman, ‘The Brakes that Failed:
Constitutional Restriction of International
Agreements in France’ (2012) 45 Cornell
International Law Journal 257, 260
<http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cilj/vol45/iss2/
1>; Pierre M Eisemanm and Paphaële Rivier,
‘France’ in Nation Treaty Law and Practice,
similar with respect to society, politics or
economy, especially in matters that
originated from the country’s necessity and
social and political contexts.
Nevertheless, difficulty has arisen
with regard to making treaties in Thailand.
Subject to the country’s constitutional
provisions, it seems that all forms of treaty
should be approved by the Parliament, like
in the USA.28 However, there is a tendency
to interpret some enacted matters of the
constitution, including treaties broadly
affecting the durability of the economy and
society and treaties significantly involving
the national investment and budget. In such
interpretations, all categories of treaty that
affect broadly the society or significantly
bring about commitment to the national
budget have a direct and indirect impact on
social and budgetary aspects of the country.
Overall, the tendency of courts has
been to interpret the true definition of
“significantly” or “broadly” according to the
spirit of the constitution. Though Thailand’s
constitution provides that the National
Assembly’s approval shall be required for
concluding some categories of treaty, those
words in the constitution’s provisions
Duncan B Hollis et al (eds.) (Martinus Nijhoff
Publishers, 2005) 253, 259.
28รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
190 cl 2.
Brawijaya Law Journal Vol.4 No.1 2017 Constitutional Issues and Indigenous Rights
suggest that all treaties shall be made on the
condition that the Senate gives prior
approval, as in the USA.
According to this study’s examination
of the legislative branch’s involvement in
making of treaties, the author has found that
the legislative branch in France has less
treaty-making power and duties than in
Thailand and the USA,29 especially in the
context of inspection of the exercise of the
treaty-making power of the executive
branch.  It could be said that in the matter of
concluding “international commitments”,30
the French Parliament has little role, and its
power is restricted to approve and
disapprove, not to modify, the provisions
thereof.
Meanwhile, the US Senate used to
have a considerable role in participating in
initial processes, which included setting up
the objectives and negotiation framework of
the treaty as well as approving the
Executive’s negotiation framework. This
form of power may cause difficulty in
making treaties, however, and this
sophisticated process led to the US President
29New Zealand Law Commission, The Treaty Making
Process Reform and the Role of Parliament, Report 45:
Appendix A: France (December 1997) [A43]
<http://www.nzlii.org/nz/other/nzlc/report/R45/>.
30La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French
Constitution of 4 October 1958] art 53.
31The Congressional Research Service (CRS), Library
of Congress, United States of Congress, Treaties and
Other International Agreements: The Role of the
United States Senate (United States Government
Printing Office, 2001) 4-5.
32United States Constitution art II § 2 cl 2; Ibid 6.
having the exclusive power to conclude an
executive agreement––“congressional
executive agreements, agreements pursuant
to treaties and Presidential or sole executive
agreements” 31––, which is not considered a
treaty statutorily and, thus, does not require
the advice and consent of two thirds of the
Senate.32
The problems and practices in the
USA are similar to those coming to Thailand
soon. The executive branch is committed to
drafting a negotiation framework and
submitting it to the Legislature for approval.
Moreover, the executive must provide for
the constitutional principle of “the people’s
participation” and “direct democracy”. In
accordance with the constitution, the
Executive, thus, declares a negotiation
framework to the people for a “public
hearing” 33 before a treaty negotiation is
conducted.34 This principle is an important
cause of inconvenience and obstruction that
has arisen in treaty making now in Thailand.
The procedure under domestic law is
significant because it has a consequence for
the constitutionality of treaties.
33รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
190 cl 3.
34Benjamin Sukanjanajtee, Promoting ASEAN
Economic Community through Greater
Participation and Transparency in Treaty Making
Procedures: Thailand’s Internal Process and
ASEAN Rules of Procedure, Embracing the New
Role of ALA after the ASEAN Charter, 11th General
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Nevertheless, on the basis of international
law, the procedures or incompleteness of
such domestic laws do not have an effect on
international relations and obligations.35
More importantly, it has been
questioned why the US constitution provides
that all categories of treaty will be made
upon the Senate’s approval and not the entire
Legislature’s. Traditionally, the Senate is
entitled representatives from each state;
thus, when the Federation of States make
any treaties that may cause commitments
that fall to another state, it is provided that
the state’s representatives shall play a partial
role in in initial processes, which includes
setting the objectives and negotiation
framework as well as reviewing the
framework for advising on and consent to
the negotiation framework. This principle is
enacted in the US constitution in conformity
with the “Agent Theory” 36 on treaty-making
power.
Given the nation’s history, the US
constitution provides that the Senate shall be
involved in and informed of the initial
processes of making treaties and that each
state’s representative shall be competent on
this matter as citizen. The Senate’s role in
relation to treaty making seems to be that of
an assistant to the President on behalf of the
35Law of Treaties Convention art 27, art 46.
36Helfer and Meyer, above n 8, 4-5.
37 Francois Luchaire, ‘The Participation of Parliament
in the Elaboration and Application of Treaties-
Federation of States. In contrast, the French
Parliament, as the nation’s legislative
branch, shall not have powers other than
those of certifying, by enactment as an Act,
the President’s ratification, affirming the
view of Professor Luchaire.37 However, the
exercise of power in Thailand’s Legislature
is not that of an assistant of the executive
branch of government responsible for
concluding the international relationship and
agreement, like in the US Senate, but it uses
its power for inspection of and control over
the exercise of executive power.
C. Which Organ Having Power to Rule
on the Conflict between the Key and
Secondary Organ
In the context of organs having the
power to rule on any dispute in relation to the
conclusion of treaties, the regulatory
practices exercised by the USA, Thailand,
and France and are dissimilar. In other
words, the determination of practices is
made on the basis of their own features and
domestic law contexts.
The Republic of France established a
“political organ” having the power to rule on
any dispute in relation to treaty making. This
organ is not given legal status as a judicial
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organ but was established and provided its
power and duties under the Constitution on the
basis of the origin and power of “political
power”, namely the “Constitutional Council”.
There is “a composition” of members
originally made up in judicial and political
contexts, such as President of the Republic,
former senators, former representatives, etc.38
Significantly, in term of exercising
power to rule on any legal dispute in relation
to the conclusion and enforcement of treaties,
the organ having trial and adjudication power
shall be set up specifically for ruling on the
“constitutionality of international
commitment”. These are sometimes called,
by public law scholars, 39 “engagements
interna-tionaux.” “International
Commitments” that have not been enforced
on the Republic of France shall belong to the
jurisdiction of the Constitutional Council.40
As a result, the Council is a key organ, one
with constitutional power to oversee the
38La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French
Constitution of 4 October 1958] art 56; Ministry of
Justice, The French Legal System: Judicial System
(Ministère de la Justice, 2012) 3-7
<http://www.justice.gouv.fr/publication/french_leg
al_system.pdf>.
39Nantawat Boramanant, The France Constitutional
Court: Part 2 (20 December 2004) Public Law Net 3-
4 <http://www.pub-
law.net/publaw/view.aspx?id=176#m15>.
40Noelle Lenoir, ‘Constitutional Council and the
European Convention of Human Right: The French
Paradox’ in Judicial Review in International
Perspective (Kluwer Law International, 2000) 145,
162.
41E Lauterpacht and C J Greenwood (eds.), 98
International Law Reports (Research Center for
International Law, University of Cambridge, 1994)
180.
constitutional review of the executive’s
exercise of treaty making power. 41
On the other hand, “treaties” previously
enforced shall be taken into the Conseil
d’Etat’s––or the Supreme Administrative
Court’s––consideration whenever the
executive branch’s exercise of power must
conform to the doctrine of the “legitimacy of
treaties”––that is to say, whenever they
exercise rule by means of “political power” or
“legal power.42
In the USA, the organ having the
power to rule on treaties is the “Supreme
Court” of the United States, 43 which
exercises judicial and legal power but not
political power in form of a judicial organ
because the US legal system is not a “dual-
court system”––with a Court of Justice and
an Administrative Court––like Thailand 44
and France. 45 As regards the exercise of
treaty-making power, the US Constitution
provides that the Supreme Court of the
42La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French
Constitution of 4 October 1958] art 55; René
Chapus, Droit administratif general Tome 1
(Montchrestien, 14 édtion, 2000) 137 cited in
Banjerd Singkanati et al, The Reviewing
Constitutionality of Law, Which Impact to Human
Rights (Constitutional Study Institute, Thailand
Constitutional Court, 2009) 185.
43United States Constitution art VI § 2.
44รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
199.
45 French Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The French Justice
System (June 2007) Embassy of France in
Washington, D.C 2 <http://ambafrance-
us.org/IMG/pdf/Justice_ag.pdf>.
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Federation shall have an exclusive power to
rule on a treaty-making dispute.46
As a result of the difference in their
legal systems and the different origins of the
judicial functions in the USA and France,
their practices surrounding the adjudication in
the matter of treaty making are not similar. In
Thailand, it is provided that the function and
power of adjudicating any dispute arising
from the exercise of the Legislative’s and the
Executive’s power shall be within the
Constitutional Court’s jurisdiction.47
Most importantly, in practice, the
Administrative Court has tried and
adjudicated a case in relation to the
conclusion of a treaty accomplished by the
Executive branch, which did not conform to
the constitutional provision. 48 The
Administrative Court’s decision on this
matter led to widespread academic and
political criticism of the legality of the
judiciary. The question is whether the
Administrative Court intervened in the
Executive’s legal function in the dimension
of international relations.49
In brief, the duties of an organ having
the power to rule on a treaty-making dispute
46United States Constitution art III § 2.
47รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
190 cl 6.
48รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
223 cl 2.
is based on the political context of each
country, and these developments informed
their various domestic laws.
Adjudicated Problem Of Exercising
Treaty-Making Power In Thailand
According to the findings of this study,
problems caused by the judicial organs’
decisions can be separated into three groups:
first, ambiguity in the context of categories
of treaty in principle and submitting
processes for the Legislature’s approval;
second, the problem of enforcement and
interpretation of constitutional provisions;
and third, with respect to the courts’
jurisdictions, whether any treaty-making
dispute should be submitted to the
Administrative Court.
A. Ambiguity in the Context of Categories
of Treaty in Principle and Submitting
Process for the Secondary Organ’s
Approval
The constitutional principles related to
treaty-making bring about different
interpretations. The constitutional
provisions use some words that have led to
49Vorajet Pakeerath, Act of Government and the
Supreme Administrative Court Order No.
547/2551(Preah Vihear Temple [Prasat Phra
Wihan]) (5 October 2008) Public Law Net 3-4
<http://www.pub-law.net/publaw
/view.aspx?id=1292>.
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different interpretations, especially treaties
affecting “economic and social stability
broadly” or even treaties resulting in
“significant” binding effects upon the trade,
investment and budget of the country. 50
Therefore, by virtue of the spirit of the
constitution, it should be indicated how
many types of treaty and what the
characteristics of each treaty type are. In
connection with this, the author studied
explanation and discussion documents
written by the Drafting Commission of the
Constitution of the Kingdom of Thailand
2007 (B.E. 2550); yet, there was no evidence
showing that the ideas discussed and
exchanged on the meanings of key words in
the Constitution. 51 The Commission
expressed some concern about the true
definitions of each word because some
words led to the possibility of different
interpretations. The commission did not
clarify their exact meanings.
Further, the constitutional provisions
made treaties of the legislative branch
irrelevant to the concept of treaty-making
power, which, in practice, is in the
Executive’s hand. Subject to the
Constitution, the Legislature has so much
dominance over Thailand’s treaty making
50รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๐[Constitution
of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E. 2550 (2007)] §
190 cl 2.
51Office of the Representative of Thailand, Meeting
Report of Drafting Constitution of the Kingdom of
Thailand Committee No. 33/2550 (24 June 2007) 90-
92
procedure and negotiation power that the
Executive was affected as a result of
Legislative intervention. This does not
comply with the concept of “parliamentary
participation” in matters of the negotiation
framework submitted to the Legislature for
approval and the public dissemination
required for a public hearing on such a
framework, which, in theory, must be
accomplished before the Executive’s treaty
making with other countries.
This practice does not conform to the
exercise of the Executive’s power and
causes the inefficiency of its treaty making.
For example, Bilateral Investment Treaties
(BITs) with more than 54 countries52 are still
suspended in the process of negotiation. This
delay is caused by a complicated treaty
making procedure that includes submitting
the negotiation framework and reporting it to
the National Assembly, especially in case of
international treaties, as stipulated in the
Constitution. Submission of a negotiation
framework to the National Assembly seems
to take a long time.
Recently, there was delay at the
conclusion of international agreements with
ASEAN-Korea Free Trade Area (FTA),
<http://library2.parliament.go.th/giventake/content_
meeting/062550.html>.
52International Economic Department, Ministry
Foreign Affairs of Thailand, The Information on
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ASEAN-Japan FTA, ASEAN-India, and
ASEAN-Australia-New Zealand FTA. 53
While the Cabinet approved these treaties,
the new constitutional principles provide a
more complicated process. In particular, the
National Assembly’s approval is required.
Meanwhile, other ASEAN countries have
the power to conclude the above-mentioned
agreements and have enforced them without
trouble since 2007 (B.E. 2550), followed by
Thailand two years later (in 2009). This
reveals that the enforcement of agreements
in Thailand has been slower than in other
ASEAN Countries.54
B. Problem on Enforcement and
Interpretation of Constitutional
Provisions.
Compounding the ambiguity of the
treaty-making principle, there have been
some questions about the Constitutional
Court’s rulings in cases of disputes
involving the exercise of the treaty-making
power. In 1999, for example, in a case
involving a letter of intent sent to the IMF
requesting academic and financial support,
the Constitutional Court ruled that this
53Department of Foreign Trade, Ministry of
Commerce of Thailand, ‘Taxation Utilization from
FTA’ (2011) 1 (1) Trade Reference Journal 1, 8-21
<http://fta.dft.go.th/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=ofj
HFTyfRX0%3D&tabid=92&mid= 446>.
54Duanden Nikomborirak, et al, The Study the Impact
of Article 190 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of
Thailand B.E. 2550 on Treaty Making related to
agreement signed with IMF was not in the
nature of a treaty on the grounds that the
letter of intent did not include two concepts
based on international law concerning
unilateral action. When a government cannot
abide by the commitments provided in its
letter of intent, the Court concluded, there
shall not be any state responsibility arising
therefrom. The other decision involved the
absence of subjectivity55 as shown in the
letter of intent because neither the Thai
government nor the IMF had the intention to
create binding effects because of this action.
This ruling is considered case law now and
shall be followed subsequently.
Notwithstanding, in 2000, when
Thailand agreed to ratify and implement the
Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD),
a case was filed in the Constitutional Court
for adjudication. The Court ruled that this
convention had the consequence of creating
a change of state jurisdiction in a
“substantive” context considered to belong
to the exercise of sovereignty of the
Executive. The Court also affirmed that such
treaty making shall not only lead to state
jurisdiction change of “maritime territory”
but also be taken into the Legislature’s
Trade and Investment in Thailand (National
Research Council of Thailand, 2009) 5-10, 5-11.
55Prasit Pivawatanapanich, Treaty Making Problems
of the Constitution of Thailand B.E. 2550 (30
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consideration for approval. Evidently, this
problem has arisen from a wide
interpretation that does not conform to the
spirit of the constitution stating that treaties
on “geographical change” in relation to
maritime territory, such as exclusive
economic zones and continental shelves,
shall be under Thailand’s sovereign right
and state jurisdiction. The Constitution does
not emphasis state jurisdictional changes,
however, originating from the exercise of
sovereignty, including law enactment and
enforcement as well as case trials and
adjudication.
Another incident seems important is
the case of the Japan-Thailand Economic
Partnership Agreement (JTEPA), which was
filed with the Administrative Court. It
needed to be decided whether a case in
relation to treaties should be within the
Administrative Court’s jurisdictional
competence. The decision on this matter laid
down new case law.
No disputes arising from making
treaties are within the Administrative
Court’s jurisdictional competence. Pursuant
to the Supreme Administrative Court’s
order, it is provided that the exercise of the
Cabinet’s power “involved in the National
56Vorajet Pakeerath, Act of Government and Order of
Central Administrative Court of Thailand (13 August
2015) Public Law Net 1-2 <http://www.pub-
law.net/publaw/view.aspx?id=1264>.
57Amorn Juntarasomboon, Order No. 984/2551 of
Central Administrative Court of Thailand Correct or
Assembly”, or the legislature branch, for the
purpose of “international relations”, or the
exercise of the administrative power of the
Cabinet, as constitutional organ, is provided
by the Constitution, not on behalf of a State
official. The signing of such an agreement
involved the use of executive power in
international relations. Consequently, such
treaty-making power was not within the
jurisdiction of the Administrative Court.56
Nevertheless, the Administrative
Court’s 2008 order does not comply with the
2007 order against JTAPA. As regards the
signing of the Joint Communiqué between
Thailand and Cambodia regarding the bid to
have the Preah Vihear ruins listed as a World
Heritage Site, the Administrative Court held
that the Minister of Foreign Affairs and the
Cabinet’s signing of the treaty was carried
out on behalf of the Thai government as a
“State Official” in connection with foreign
affairs. This involved the use of
administration power in general, which is
within the Administrative Court’s
jurisdiction in accordance with the Act on
the Establishment of the Administrative
Court and the Administrative Court
Procedure B.E. 2542 (1999). Thus, such an
act by the government shall be deemed an
“administrative act” 57 carried out by State
Not? (Temporary Protective Measures from Suitcase
for Revoking the Joint Communique between Thailand
and Cambodia as Register the Preah Vihear as World
Heritage Site) (10 November 2015) Administrative
Court of Thailand 24 <http://www.admincourt.
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officials falling under the jurisdictional
competence of the Administrative Court.
The Administrative Court’s decision on this
matter led to economic and political
criticism stating that it did not comply with
law previously lain down by the court itself
in the case of the Administrative Court’s fair
trial and adjudication against JTEPA related
to the use of the executive power on treaty
making.
The Joint Communiqué in question
was filed with the Constitutional Court,
which gave the ruling on the grounds that it
was related to a treaty that “may provide for
a change” in the Thai territory and “may lead
to a vast impact on economic and social
stability of the country”. 58 Thus, the
National Assembly must approve the Joint
Communiqué as provided by the
Constitution. The Constitutional Court’s
ruling brought about widespread criticism,
especially because the Court added the word
“may” to its interpretation of the original
provision of the Constitution. This word, in
go.th/attach/news_attach/2008/08/Article20080807.pd
f>.
58Joint Communiqué on Preah Vihear Case [The
Constitutional Court of Thailand] No. 6-7/2551, 8
July 2008 reported in [2008] 125 (108A) The Royal
Gazette of Thailand 23-25.
59Pivawatanapanich, above n 55, 18.
60International Monetary Fund (IMF) Case [The
Constitutional Court of Thailand] No.11/2542, 25
May 1999 reported in [1999] 116 (63A) The Royal
Gazette of Thailand 9-10.
61Convention of Biological Diversity (CBD) Case
[The Constitutional Court of Thailand]
No.33/2543, 5 October 2000 reported in [2001]
118, (68A) The Royal Gazette of Thailand 82-84.
fact, is not provided in the Constitution
because a legislation function is not
provided to the judiciary. Jurists call this
type of act “judicial legislation.”59
It is obvious that the Administrative
and Constitutional Court’s rulings on
various treaty disputes are not provided on
similar grounds because some shall be in
compliance with the constitutional
provisions while others shall not.
This was shown in the Constitutional
Court’s ruling in the case of a letter of intent
requesting academic and financial support
from the IMF (International Monetary
Fund)60 and the Convention of Biological
Diversity (CBD), 61 as well as the
Administrative Court’s decision against
JTEPA62 along with the Joint Communiqué
between Thailand and Cambodia to have
Preah Vihear listed as a World Heritage Site,
which Cambodia made by means of a
unilateral act.63
62Japan-Thailand Economic Partnership Agreement
(JTEPA) Case [The Supreme Administrative Court
of Thailand] No. 178/2550, 30 March 2007





63Joint Communiqué on Preah Vihear Case [The
Supreme Administrative Court of Thailand] No.
547/2551, 8 September 2008 reported in The
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Both courts’ rulings64 on these matters
have been criticized widely with respect to
the Judiciary’s stability and creditability in
relation to the sovereign power of the
Executive. This led to trouble and confusion
surrounding the exercise of treaty making
sovereignty in Thailand.
Recent comparative studies show that
the practice and the Constitution of the
Republic of France stipulate that the
“Constitutional Council” shall adjudicate
and try any disputes arising from the
concluding of treaties based on “political
power” as provided by the Constitution.
When there is a problem regarding the
“constitutionality of international
commitments”,65 the matter in question must
be decided “in the process of treaty making.”
Also, when a treaty comes into force and
there is a question regarding the “legality of
international obligations”, like the
enforcement of laws enacted as a
consequence of international agreements, it
shall be within the Conseil d’ Etat’s or
Supreme Administrative Court’s function of
trial and adjudication on the grounds that the
problem has arisen from “legal power”.
The author realizes that the
Constitutions of Thailand and France specify
similar principle legislation and similar dual-
court systems. Thus, as provided by the
64Joint Communiqué on Preah Vihear Case above n
58, 23.
French Constitution, the exercise of power
of the Constitutional organs should be
implemented to lay down functions and
principles that will be enforced in Thai
Judiciary trials and adjudications of cases in
relation to treaty making.
C. Problem Arisen from the Courts’
Jurisdiction: Should the Matter of
Treaty Making Fall within the
Administrative Court’s?
It is generally known that the United
States has a single-court system, unlike
France and Thailand, which have dual-court
systems. In the US, the federal court
exercises jurisdiction over questions of the
exercise of either the political or legal power
of the executive branch. Meanwhile, in
Thailand and France, the exercise of political
power shall only be inspected and reviewed
when the use of power in question is one
belonging to the executive or legislative
branch, especially in cases involving the
exercise of power of the Executive in
connection with determining the
administration policies that shall be checked
and controlled by political process of the
Parliament. This type of power is conferred
directly to the Legislature with “political
65La Constitution du 4 octobre 1958 [French
Constitution of 4 October 1958] art 54; Luchaire,
above n 39, 351.
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accountability”66 that must fall within “the
Constitution” and not within Administrative
Law.67
On the other hand, the Judicial Branch
only has the power to rule on disputes
involving the legality of case law. 68 For
cases involving the exercise of the legal
power of other organs, the balance of power
as well as the use of sovereignty must be
consistent with “the principle of checks and
balances”, which is also under the
jurisdiction of the Judicial Branch. In
addition, use of the “legal power” of the
Executive over “acts and subordinate
legislation” falls within the purview of the
Judiciary. On the contrary, the use of
“political power” by the Executive
constitutes the use of “constitutional power”.
For example, in principle, the initiation of
international relations shall not fall within
the authority of the judicial power69 unless
the case involves constitutional principles
and provisions, as required for the balance of
political power.70
There remains, however, the important
question of how the problem of the
Administrative Court’s jurisdiction over the
exercise of political power provided for in
66 Borvornsak Uvanno, Legal Science Analyzing on
the Central Administrative Court Order Related to
Protective Measures for Temporary Relief in Joint
Communiqué between the Thailand and Cambodia
(30 September 2015) King Prajadhipok's Institute
3-4 <http://kpi.ac.th/media/pdf/M10_71.pdf>.
67Ibid 3; Pakeerath, above n 56, 2.
the Thai Constitution should be resolved. In
the case of the Joint Communiqué submitted
to the Central Administrative Court, the
Administrative Court does not have
conferred power to rule on “the
constitutionality” of the treaty making of the
Executive even though the Foreign Affairs
Minister is of a “State official”. This is
because, in making treaties, the minister is
considered “ex officio”, as provided by the
1969 Vienna Convention, or is considered a
“State representative” under the Constitution
(i.e., not under other laws or regulations).
This principle is consistent with the
Constitution of the France Republic and the
Supreme Administrative Court’s Order in
2007 in the case of JATAPA.
Most importantly, the issue that needs
to be reconsidered is what principle should
be explained in cases of the Administrative
Court’s decision on the Executive’s exercise
of political power to make treaties. If the
Administrative Court were competent to
control and check the Executive’s
functioning,71 would this lead to difficulties
making treaties for the Executive Branch in
the future.72 In the opinion of the author,
whether the Administrative Court will be
68Pornson Leangboonlertchai, ‘US Constitution and
Limitation Power of the Federal Court’ (2553) 1 (1)
ABAC Law Journal 60-61.
69Ibid, p. 60.
70Uwanno, above n 66, 4.
71Ibid 5.
72Pakeerath, above n 56, 3.
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conferred legitimate power to rule on such
actions depends on the constitutional
legislators’ intention. Control over the
exercise of political power in relation to
international agreements conferred to the
Administrative Court should be restricted
and modified by the enactment of the
principles and functions of the constitution
as well as the exercise of power of the
Administrative Court. Nevertheless, the
question remains, “What legal concept and
theory shall be applied by the constitutional
drafting legislator to confer jurisdictional
competence to the Administrative Court in
the matters of dispute arising from
international treaty making?”
Reform Of Treaty-Making Power And
Process Principle In Thailand And
Remaining Problems
Since the Constitutional Court’s ruling
in the Joint Communiqué case––which
stated that the Court had jurisdiction over
any treaty or international agreement that
“may” provide for a change in Thai
territory––led to uncertainty in terms of
treaty-making powers and the types of
treaties that the National Assembly must
approve, the 2007 drafting of a constitutional
amendment under Prime Minister Yingluck
Shinnawat’s government was proposed. As
noted above, the Court’s ruling brought
about widespread criticism. Thus, the
constitutional drafting committee proposed
that the word “explicitly” be inserted in
place of “may”. However, the new treaty-
making process delete an emphasis on the
legislative’s power of submitting and
approving all negotiation frameworks that,
in principle, are laid down in the Executive’s
power; further, all of these frameworks are
required to be heard by means of public
participation. While legislative members
protested this concept, the draft constitution
was consistent with international practices as
well as legal requirements for the
Executive’s treaty making.
Nonetheless, this draft of the
Constitution was denied on the grounds that
its modification process had not been subject
to existing Constitutional provisions.
Indeed, one of the reasons the draft
constitution is void is the political interest
game that surrounded it.
In 2014, General Prayut Chan-o-cha
staged a military coup against the
government and assumed control of the
country under concepts provided by the
interim 2014 constitution (B.E.2557). The
new constitution is now being elaborated.
The interim constitution did not elaborate
the power of the Executive in terms of
submission of a treaty negotiation
framework for the Legislature’s approval,
nor any terms of public participation. Under
irregular circumstances, “the National
Legislative Assembly shall act as the House
of Representatives, the Senate, and the
Brawijaya Law Journal Vol.4 No.1 2017 Constitutional Issues and Indigenous Rights
21
National Assembly,”73 which are normally
elected by people. In the interim
constitution, there are only five categories of
treaty which shall be approved by the
legislature, including treaties significantly
involving trade and investment. Notably,
however, the word “significantly” is still
used, allowing more Judicial interpretation
of what types of treaties are involved
“significantly” in trade and investment. This
amendment, thus, cannot meet with success.
Meanwhile, the draft constitution
prepared by the Constitutional Drafting
Committee, headed by Professor Dr.
Bovornsak Uvanno, has failed to get approval
again. This draft constitution contained the
same principles for treaty-making processes,
with no amendment. Mostly, principles and
core contents in this draft charter were
unchanged compared to the 2007 Constitution
(B.E. 2550); this is especially important in
matters of submission of treaty negotiation
frameworks for the legislature’s approval and
public participation in negotiation processes
being run by the executive.
The above principle is contrary to the
concept that treaty-making power belongs to
the executive. While the author recognizes
the value of the constitutional principles
underscoring legislative and public
73รัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย (ฉบับชัวคราว) พทุธศักราช ๒๕๕๗
[Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand
(Interim) B.E. 2557 (2014)] § 6 cl 2.
participation, he must recognize, also, that
the role of the legislative and public
branches will be expressed only “after the
negotiation complete”, most likely leading
to the legislature’s approval and the treaty’s
ratification. Such a process emerges from the
balance of legislative power over treaty
making. Fortunately for Thailand, the
proposal for this reformed treaty-making
principle has been rejected twice.
There was another attempt to reform
Thailand’s treaty-making power when the
second Constitution Drafting Committee was
nominated by the government and headed by
Mr. Meechai Ruchuphan. Recently, the new
Constitution charter, drafted by Mr. Meechai
Ruchuphan, was approved by the majority of
Thai voters through the referendum vote. The
core principles and elements of this charter are
still similar to those of the currently-enforced
Interim Constitution of 2013 (B.E. 2557).
Meanwhile, and even more
problematically, this revised constitution
stipulates that the executive shall not be
responsible for proposing a treaty negotiation
framework for the legislature’s approval, and
significant public participation in this process
is not provided.  Nevertheless, this draft
constitution was finally approved by Thai
voters and sent to be reviewed for the
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elaboration of its facts. According to the
author, the treaty-making principle and
process should be reformed on the grounds
that determining the type of a given treaty
leads to various interpretations: there are
between five and eight types of treaty, and
many detailed provisions will need to be
written to prevent a wrong interpretation.
Particularly, imperative time should be
provided in case a treaty submitted to the
legislature is not completed and approved by
the legislature within sixty days. 74 Such a
treaty shall be deemed approved based on
legal presumptions, subject to the
Constitution’s provisions.
That principle seems to remove delays
and difficulties in making treaties, but the
question remains why, under a checks and
balances system, the Constitution does not
assume that the treaty should be considered
rejected if it is not approved by the
legislature within sixty days. This means of
checks and balances results in efficiency.
However, in case a treaty concerns the
national interest, there is no reason why the
legislature so much more delays on the
process of approval than provided. Also, the
majority of National Assembly members are
composed of government members; thus
determining these legal assumptions causes
loss of opportunity and efficiency of the
74 ร่างรัฐธรรมนูญแห่งราชอาณาจักรไทย ฉบับที ๒ [2nd Drafting the
Constitution of The Kingdom of Thailand B.E.
2559 (2016)] § 178 cl 2.
legislative’ check and balance on the
exercising executive’s power.
It is doubtful whether these legal
assumptions will facilitate the Executive’s
power in making treaties that risk losses to
the country’s interests, or even to some
stakeholders. When there is a conflict
between the executive and legislative branch
in relation to treaty making, the draft
constitution stipulates that the executive or
government shall only have the authority to
submit it to the Constitutional Court for trial
and adjudication regardless of legislative
participation.  This provision cuts down the
legislature’s role in oversight.  If the
Executive disagrees and does not submit the
conflict case to the Constitutional Court, the
legislature shall not exercise its
Constitutional power to check the legitimacy
of the executive’s exercise of political
power. In brief, although the treaty-making
process has been amended, difficult
conditions on this matter remain in Thailand.
IV. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTION
Despite several reforms of the
Constitution, the treaty-making crisis and its
related problems has remain, especially the
problem of unconformity to concepts
indicating that the treaty making power
belongs to the Executive while exercise of
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executive power must depend on the
Legislature’s role under the concept of
“checks and balances”. There has been a
problem of how to maintain checks and
balances in connection with treaty making.
Likewise, all treaty categories should be
determined clearly and there should be a
thorough correcting or removing of
modifying words such as “significantly” or
“widely, which can bring about various and
incorrect interpretations.
This analysis suggests five approaches
to addressing this crisis: 1) amending the
constitutional provisions to indicate clearly
how many categories of treaty there are and
what each category of treaty is without the use
of modifying words that can lead to various
interpretations; 2) enacting subordinating laws
following the categories of treaty and treaty-
making process, especially those involving
concrete public participation; 3) amending the
provisions of the Constitution under the title
“Legal Assumptions” by removing the phrase
“the treaty shall be approved” and inserting
“the treaty shall not be approved” instead, in
case the legislature cannot complete the
consideration within sixty days since the
current such provisions are contrary to the
principle of checks and balances required by a
parliamentary system; 4 ) amending the
constitutional provision by stipulating that
Parliament shall have the authority to submit
to the Constitutional Court a dispute between
the legislative and the executive in relation to
the exercise of treaty-making power, as
provided by the principles of separation of
powers and checks and balances; and 5 )
amending the provisions to determine clearly
the jurisdictions of the Administrative Court
and the Constitutional Court in cases of any
dispute arising from treaty making to make
them more similar to the Constitution of the
Republic of France by stipulating that the
Constitutional Court shall have the jurisdiction
to adjudicate and try “the constitutionality” of
“international commitments”, which shall not
be enforced on Thailand until the
Constitutional treaty-making process is
complete. Any such action should fall within
“the Constitutional Court’s” jurisdiction,
which is of the core judicial organs exercising
“constitutional power” to oversee any dispute
arising from Constitutional Review of the
Exercise Treaty Making Power between the
Executive and the Legislature.
Notwithstanding, any review of the “legality”
of treaties which “come into force throughout
the Kingdom” should be provided to fall
within the Supreme Administrative Court’s
jurisdiction to determine whether the exercise
of the Executive’s power conforms to the
principle of “the legality of treaties”.
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